[SERIOUS] Does self-custody make cryptocurrency structurally unsuitable for mass adoption?

I recently made a satirical post in another subreddit about the amount of security supposedly required to store Bitcoin safely. The satire deliberately exaggerated the point, but I would like to discuss the underlying concern seriously here. As a full disclosure, I am very skeptical of cryptocurrencies in general, but I find it interesting to follow.

My concern is not that the Bitcoin protocol itself is easy to hack.With self-custody, possession of the private key effectively determines control of the money. That provides genuine independence from intermediaries, but it also transfers a large collection of responsibilities from financial institutions to individual users.

A person holding a meaningful amount must potentially think about:

• Malware and compromised computers or phones
• Phishing and fraudulent wallet interfaces
• Malicious or compromised transaction addresses
• Hardware-wallet and supply-chain risks
• Secure creation and storage of seed phrases
• Fire, flooding, theft and accidental destruction
• Password or passphrase loss
• Backups that are both redundant and inaccessible to thieves
• Firmware and software updates
• Physical coercion or kidnapping
• Recovery after incapacity
• Inheritance without giving heirs premature access

The official Bitcoin guidance itself recommends measures such as multiple secure backup locations, encrypted backups, offline storage, hardware wallets, software updates, multisignature arrangements and an inheritance plan. Bitcoin Core also gives users a wallet-responsibility checklist that includes backups, cold storage, monitoring security notifications and ensuring heirs can recover the funds.

These are reasonable recommendations. The problem is that, taken together, they resemble a simplified institutional key-management program.

Professional organizations treat cryptographic key management as an entire discipline involving policies, defined responsibilities, backup, recovery, compromise procedures, lifecycle management and documented security practices. NIST has hundreds of pages of guidance on this subject. Most ordinary users cannot realistically audit their wallet software, evaluate firmware, design a robust multisignature arrangement or test an inheritance procedure without introducing another vulnerability.

I recognize the counterargument. Self-custody can be extremely valuable for people facing capital controls, political repression, unstable institutions or exclusion from financial services. Some users also knowingly accept the operational burden because censorship resistance matters more to them than recoverability, but that use case seems tiny, similar to TOR. That is not what the current valuations we see are based on. People expect mass adoption.

I believe mass adoption necessarily means that most people interact with cryptocurrency through regulated custodians and other institutions, effectively rebuilding much of the banking infrastructure that cryptocurrency was supposed to replace. However, centralization makes cryptocurrencies pointless. You might as well use a database, or some kind of centralized standard like SWIFT used by thousands of institutions to send money.

Obviously, most people here believe in cryptocurrencies. How do you solve the contradiction in my previous paragraph?

Sources

• "Bitcoin.org: Securing your wallet" (https://bitcoin.org/en/secure-your-wallet)
• "Bitcoin Core: Wallet responsibility checklist" (https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-core/features/requirements)
• "NIST: Key-management guidance" (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Key-Management/Key-Management-Guidelines)